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NATIONAL POLICY: Security

Executive Order 10501

President Nixon Explains New Security Classification System

President Richard Nixon, signing Executive Order 10501 on Mar. 8, said he was establishing a new, more progressive system for classification and declassification of Government documents relating to national security.

Mr. Nixon said the reform springs from a review he initiated almost 14 months ago and represents the first major overhaul of classificaton procedures since 1953.

Addressing the shortcomings of the present classification system, the President said:

"Unfortunately, the system of classification which has evolved in the United States has failed to meet the standards of an open and democratic society, allowing too many papers to be classified for too long a time. The controls which have been imposed on classification authority have proved unworkable, and classification has frequently served to conceal bureaucratic mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and administrations."

Mr. Nixon balanced that background note by making this observation:

"Yet since the early days of the Republic, Americans have also recognized that the Federal Government is obliged to protect certain information which might otherwise jeopardize the security of the country. That need has become particularly acute in recent years as the United States has assumed a powerful position in world affairs, and as world peace has come to depend in large part on how that position is safeguarded. We are also moving into an era of delicate negotiations in which it will be especially important that governments be able to communicate in confidence."

Noting that good rules can never be airtight and that the good judgment of individuals must be relied upon, the Chief Executive said he has a basis for optimism.

He said the new system becomes effective June 1, 1972, and its significant fea-

(Continued On Page 2)

COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 11, No. 23 **April 6, 1972**

PRISONERS OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION

JCS Chairman Reaffirms National Concern For PW/MIAs

Following is a statement by Admiral T. H. Moorer, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on National Week of Concern for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, March 26-April 1, 1972:

"The President of the United States and the Congress have designated this week as one of national concern for those brave Americans who are prisoners of war or missing in action as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Our Nation's Government has never ceased in its efforts to impress upon the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong their responsibility in abiding by the Geneva Conventions . . . to which they were signatories . . . in the treatment of these Americans.

"Our concern for these men has been expressed to the adversary in every way possible, but to date the response continues to be discouraging. All Americans should assert our opposition to the enemy's neglect in providing adequate care and treatment of prisoners of war, and their refusal to disclose identities.

"During this week of national concern, and united as one in resolution and prayer, we have the opportunity to extend our deepest sympathy and encouragement to the families of these men. I know that I join millions of my fellow Americans in declaring that the lives and safety of these men are foremost in our minds. We will be unyielding in our efforts to help make their safe return a reality."

NEW SECURITY SYSTEM

(Continued From Page 1)

tures are:

—The rules for classifying documents are more restrictive.

—The number of Departments and people who can originally classify information has been substantially reduced.

—Timetables ranging from 6 to 10 years have been set for automatic declassification of documents. Exceptions will be allowed only for such information as falls within four specifically defined categories.

—Any document exempted from automatic declassification will be subject to mandatory review after a 10-year period. Thus, for the first time, a private citizen is given a clear right to have national security information reviewed on the basis of specified criteria to determine if continued classification is warranted, so long as the document can be adequately identified and obtained by the Government with a reasonable amount of effort.

—If information is still classified 30 years after origination, it will then be automatically declassified unless the head of the originating Department determines in writing that its continued protection is still necessary and he sets a time for declassification.

—Sanctions may be imposed upon those who abuse the system.

—And a continuing monitoring process will be set up under the National Security Council and an Interagency Classification Review Committee, whose Chairman is to be appointed by the President.

The three categories of classified information—Top Secret, Secret, Confidential—remain as names but have been redefined (see accompanying box). Also redefined are procedures governing their classification, downgrading and declassification.

Shortly after the President signed the Executive Order to bring about the change, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, J. Fred Buzhardt, spelled out details to the Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Armed Services Committee.

In giving his initial summary, Mr. Buzhardt said the principal changes are:

(1) The number of Departments and Agencies authorized to classify at any given level of classification is reduced;

(2) The authority of the heads of Departments and Agencies to delegate classification authority within each Department or Agency is more restricted;

(3) The class of persons to whom authority to declassify can be delegated is specifically not limited to those who are eligible for a delegation of authority to classify;

(4) The downgrading and declassification schedule is accelerated;

(5) Exceptions to the general downgrading and declassification schedule are limited to four specific categories of information;

(6) All classified information which is not automatically declassified at the end of 10 years is made subject to a mandatory classification review upon request;

(7) All classified information not sooner declassified is automatically declassified at the end of 30 years unless the head of the Department personally determines in writing at the time to continue protection for specified reasons;

(8) Information classified under previous executive orders and more than 30 years old is to be systematically reviewed and declassified by the Archivist;

(9) A mechanism is established to review departmental and agency implementation of the system, and to consider and take action on complaints;

(10) Administrative reprimands are authorized for employes who overclassify information in flagrant cases; and

(11) The definition of information which qualifies for classification in each category is reworded in terms of "national security" rather than "national defense."

Executive Order Redefines Classification

Top Secret. "Top Secret" refers to that national security information or material which requires the highest degree of protection. The test for assigning "Top Secret" classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of "exceptionally grave damage" include armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security. This classification shall be used with the utmost restraint.

Secret. "Secret" refers to that national security information or material which requires a substantial degree of protection. The test for assigning "Secret" classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of "serious damage" include disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security. The classification "Secret" shall be sparingly used.

Confidential. "Confidential" refers to that national security information or material which requires protection. The test for assigning "Confidential" classification shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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Includes PW Release Provisions

Latest U.S./South Vietnamese Peace Plan Detailed

Background: Late in 1969, President Nixon initiated a series of high-level private negotiations with North Vietnam to explore the possibility of new approaches to a peace settlement. On January 25, 1972, he laid the record of these secret negotiations before the American people along with the full details of our latest peace plan.

U.S./South Vietnamese Proposals

Withdrawal of Forces

—All U.S./Allied forces would withdraw from South Vietnam within six months of an agreement in principle on an overall settlement.

—Our withdrawals (together with prisoner releases) would start as soon as such an agreement is reached and would continue while a final agreement covering such political issues as elections is worked out. Our withdrawals would be completed when a final agreement is signed.

—We do not insist on withdrawal of enemy forces at the same time as U.S./Allied forces withdraw. We ask only that Hanoi accept the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers. Without abandoning the principle of mutuality, we are flexible on timing and willing to withdraw our forces before North Vietnam withdraws its forces.

—Alternatively, we are willing to fix a date for the unilateral withdrawal of U.S./Allied forces provided all prisoners are released and there is agreement on a cease-fire.

Release of Prisoners

—Prisoners of war (PWs) would be released concurrently with U.S. troop withdrawals, beginning as soon as an overall agreement in principle has been reached.

—Alternatively, PWs would be released as part of an agreement only on military issues, including a fixed date for U.S. withdrawal and a cease-fire.

—Or, as we proposed in October 1970, we are ready to negotiate separately the immediate, unconditional release of all prisoners as a simple act of humanity.

Cease-Fire

—There should be a cease-fire throughout Indochina, to begin when an overall agreement is signed and to include a prohibition on further infiltration of North Vietnamese forces into other countries of Indochina.

—Alternatively, we would negotiate a cease-fire as part of an agreement on PW releases and U.S./Allied withdrawal, rather than as part of an overall agreement.

Political Settlement

—A free, democratic presidential election would be held in South Vietnam within six months of the signing of a final agreement.

—An independent body would be set up as soon as final agreement is reached to organize and run the election.

—All political forces, including the National Liberation Front (NLF), could participate in the election and be represented in the independent electoral body.

—There would be international supervision of the election.

—The President and Vice President of South Vietnam would resign one month before the election. The Chairman of the South Vietnamese Senate, as caretaker head of the Government, would assume administrative responsibilities except for those involving the election.

—All U.S./Allied forces would be withdrawn before the election.

Other Major Elements

—Both sides would respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva accords.

—South Vietnam, along with the other countries of Indochina, would adopt a foreign policy consistent with the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva accords.

—There would be international supervision of the military elements of an agreement.

—The U.S. would accept limitations on its military and economic assistance to South Vietnam, if North Vietnam accepts limitations on aid from its allies.

—The U.S. would be prepared to undertake a massive post-war reconstruction program in Indochina of several billion dollars, in which North Vietnam could share.

North Vietnam/NLF Position

The other side does not accept our eight-point peace plan and continues to insist that their position as set forth in the July 1971 "seven-point proposal" and February 1972 "elaboration" be accepted as a basis for agreement. Their two fundamental demands—total, unconditional U.S./Allied withdrawal by a fixed date and the replacement of Saigon's current leadership by a coalition regime—have not changed.

Their current proposals, in brief, include the following principal elements:

—Unconditional U.S./Allied withdrawal including cessation of air activity directed against Vietnam;

—The Vietnamese themselves will settle the problem of "Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam";

—Prisoners will be released on the terminal date of U.S./Allied withdrawal provided an overall agreement is reached;

—The immediate resignation of President Thieu, an end to the present Saigon Government's "warlike policy" and the dismantling of its "oppressive machinery";

—Elections after these steps are taken and a new coalition regime has been set up.

Reference: State Department GIST-Vietnam Peace Proposals, No. 7 (Rev. 2, dated March 1972).

SETTLING THE WAR IN VIETNAM—

A CONCISE SUMMARY

Secretary of State William P. Rogers Explains the U.S. Government's Position Regarding the War In Southeast Asia

Appearing on the CBS television program "Face the Nation" Feb. 6, Secretary of State William P. Rogers summarized U. S. policy regarding determination to negotiate a settlement of the Vietnam War and pointed up problems repeatedly encountered with the other side during the Paris sessions. His remarks constitute one of the most comprehensive expressions of U. S. policy on Vietnam negotiations since President Richard Nixon discussed his 8-point plan for peace in Indochina on nationwide television Jan. 25 and the plan was formally presented to the other side at the Paris session held the following day.

(Editor's Note: Prior to the regular Paris session on Mar. 23, the President directed that a harder U. S./South Vietnam position on further routine weekly meetings in Paris be put before the other side. This was done by U. S. Ambassador William J. Porter, who said, among other things, "it would be a mockery" of U. S. concern for the more than 1,600 American PW/MIAs for the U. S. and the South Vietnamese to "sit in this room with you and listen to more of your blackmail and distortions to the effect that the prisoner of war issue is an 'imaginary problem'." The U. S. and South Vietnam thus did not agree to a Paris session on March 30, which falls within the National Week of Concern for PW/MIAs as proclaimed by President Nixon at the request of the U. S. Congress.)

As reprinted from the Feb. 28 issue of the Department of State "Bulletin," the following are excerpts from Secretary Rogers' statements during his Feb. 6 appearance on "Face the Nation," summarizing the U. S. position just prior to the President's and Ambassador Porter's current action to break the deadlock of routine weekly Paris sessions. To allow continuity for his remarks, questions asked by participating newsmen have been omitted.

. . . There was never any discussion of that kind [that the U. S. could have traded a total American withdrawal for the American prisoners' release before the uncontested re-election of President Thieu last October]. In every session that we had with the North Vietnamese, they made it clear they would not talk about a military solution, except in the context of an overall political solution. . . . We have at every opportunity pointed out the North Vietnamese will not work out a military solution in the absence of an overall political solution. . . .

One of the difficulties we had is that we have all kinds of negotiations going on with the North Vietnamese. They can talk to any American, and he comes back and says what they told him. What they tell us at the negotiating table is what counts. It's quite clear that on every occasion they have said, in effect, "We will not return your prisoners of war unless you overthrow the Government in South Vietnam and work out all the other arrangements we insist on." In other words, they're using these prisoners as political hostages. There's never been any doubt about it. I would hope the American people would finally conclude that's true.

. . . So, it is not possible for us to work out any military solution unless we, in effect, give them [the other side] exactly what they want. That would mean a total defeat for the United States. . . .

* * * * *

. . . Why don't they say, "We want to observe the rules of international law, but we've got these questions on our mind, and what can we work out with you?" The fact of the matter is they don't have any intention or interest in observing the rules of international law. If they did, they could have done it a long time ago.

* * * * *

Not Saigon Regime

. . . It's not the Saigon regime that we're supporting. We're supporting the idea that the people of South Vietnam should decide themselves their future. That's the reason that we're there to begin with. If we, at this stage, said we don't care, we're perfectly prepared to have the Communists take over the Government of South Vietnam—and then it would mean eventually Laos and Cambodia, too—obviously our whole efforts would have been for naught. We have fought this war—a long, tragic, difficult war for the United States—with very good intentions. We don't want any of their territory. We just want to work out a solution so the people in South Vietnam can determine their future.

I think one of the things that the American people have a tendency to forget—I know newspapermen forget it occasionally—is that the South Vietnamese have fought this war. They aren't fighting because we made them fight. They've had a tremendous number of casualties. They're fighting for their country. If the South Vietnamese people want a Communist government, we have said that's

acceptable to us. But we're not going to at this stage just pull up stakes and get out and say to Communists, "You go ahead and take it over, we're sorry about this whole thing."

* * * * *

. . . When they talk about self-determination, they're not talking about what we mean by self-determination. They're talking about putting a government in South Vietnam that they select and there's a Communist control of that country.

Now, we're quite flexible on how we determine what the people want. They [the North Vietnamese] talk about self-determination. What do they mean? How do you decide what the people of South Vietnam want unless you ask them? We're quite flexible about how we do it. When I say "we," I mean President Thieu is quite flexible. He's prepared to have an electoral commission that includes all elements of the society, including the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government (National Liberation Front/VietCong)]. He's prepared to resign. He's prepared to work out a fair election. How else do you decide what the people of South Vietnam want unless you ask them?

What People Want

. . . He's [President Thieu] quite prepared to try to work out a system that will guarantee the future of South Vietnam will represent what the people of that country want. . . I'm talking about his recent speech in which he said he'd let everyone vote, everyone's vote would count equally, that he would permit all segments of the society, including the PRG, to take part in that election, and that PRG representatives could be included on the electoral commission.

. . . They're [the North Vietnamese] really not interested in what the people [of South Vietnam] want. That's the point. Communism doesn't really represent the will of the people. It represents the will of a small group of people that control the Communist Party.

Not One Conclusion

. . . They haven't made any suggestion at any time in the process ever, to my knowledge, that did not lead to one conclusion. That is: You get out; you overthrow the Government of South Vietnam and permit the Communists to control that whole area in Indochina. That's what

"Lest We Forget" by Harry Schaare
U.S. Air Force Art Collection

they have in mind. And they've never deviated from that. Now, if they have something else in mind, if there's some other way that they know about to determine what the people of South Vietnam want, why don't they suggest it? . . . What they have said is that the only thing they want is total control of the Government of South Vietnam. They've never made any other suggestion.

* * * * *

. . . You ask me, are we gloomy? Is this a period of gloom? The answer is no. We think the Vietnamization program has worked well. President Nixon has succeeded in getting Americans out of the combat role. Our casualties are way down. We're going to continue to reduce those. As far as the American troops are concerned, as far as our participation is concerned, President Nixon has brought this war to an end.

* * * * *

. . . What he [President Nixon] is trying to do now is to work out a fair solution to the problem of Indochina, not necessarily for the United States but for the people in the area. We find the other side is totally intransigent.

Unsuccessful Militarily

The reason for that is they have a feeling they can divide the American people. They are unsuccessful militarily. They haven't been able to infiltrate South Vietnam the way they thought they could. They haven't any international support to speak of. President Nixon's recent television address was acclaimed all over the world as a very reasonable basis for a solution to this problem. So, their [the other side's] last remaining hope is: Can they divide the American people? . . . We're not going to permit that. . . . They did it in the election in '68, and I'm sure they think they can do it again.

* * * * *

President Nixon has made a proposal that is as fair and reasonable as any proposal ever made by a nation like ours, including provision for rehabilitation of the area by a large amount of money. If we can't get negotiations started, then we'll proceed through Vietnamization. It would be much easier and much more sensible to work out something.

Not Gloomy

. . . I'm not gloomy at all. We're quite pleased at the fact that President Nixon's program has worked out so successfully. We're trying to give the other side a fair and generous opportunity to work something out in the political way.

. . . He [Minister Xuan Thuy of North Vietnam] said they were prepared to have further private talks [referring to disclosure of the secret negotiations by the President and by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] if they thought they would be productive.

* * * * *

. . . Always in negotiations things seem irreconcilable until they're reconciled. That's why you have the problem. They seemed irreconcilable about Berlin until we reconciled them. We now have an agreement on Berlin. It seemed, to begin with, that the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] talks might provide irreconcilable points of view. I think those are going to work out successfully.

. . . It's true in labor negotiations and anything else. It always seems irreconcilable because that's why you had the conflict. But at some point along the line you reconcile points of view. What we are anxious to do is to try to get them [the other side] to actively exchange ideas. I think the President's proposals provide us a foundation on which negotiations could succeed.

At White House Conference:

Secy. Rogers Reports Progress Of International Drug Control Programs

The following address was made Feb. 3 before the White House Conference on Drug Abuse by Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Secretary Rogers is Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, established last September by President Richard Nixon.

Drug addiction has become a major domestic problem in the United States. But we can never solve the problem at home unless we can succeed in winning comprehensive and effective cooperation abroad.

The basic reason why our campaign against drug abuse depends so greatly on our international diplomacy is a simple one. Much of the production and processing of illicit narcotics and other dangerous drugs takes place not in the United States but in other countries. To take a typical example, the heroin supplied to an addict in New York City or Washington, D.C., may well have originated—as opium—in Turkey and been converted to heroin in France. . . . The principal areas where the opium poppy is grown [are]: Turkey, Iran, the Soviet Union, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, India, and the so-called "golden triangle" area in the northern reaches of Burma, Thailand, and Laos.

There is another international link. While the United States—with more than 300,000 addicts—is the country most plagued by heroin addiction, the problem is growing rapidly in other nations. The number of heroin addicts in western Europe may be as high as 100,000. In short, what has already become a major problem in the United States is fast becoming a major problem in other countries as well.

Committee Established

For these reasons the President last September established the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, with myself as its Chairman. This Committee is responsible for formulating and coordinating all policies of the U.S. Government directed at stemming the flow of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs into this country from abroad. To assist the President's all-out offensive against drug abuse I have directed that effective narcotics control be one of the major objectives of our diplomacy in contacts with other governments. . . . The State Department is working in close collaboration with the Departments of Justice and Treasury in this large-scale international campaign. Our basic goal is to eliminate all opium production and the growing of poppies, thus cutting off heroin at its source. But until substitutes for legitimate and medically useful opium derivatives like codeine can be developed, we must concentrate our efforts on illicit production of opium, on processing and trafficking, and on making national and international controls more effective. Meanwhile, we are pressing ahead with programs to develop synthetic substitutes for opium derivatives.

Significant progress has already been made during the past year in our international campaign.

Most of the heroin entering the United States in recent years has originated in Turkey. Here, clearly, was where we had to start. Turkey is also a major source of opium grown for legitimate medical purposes; and for hundreds of years Turkish farmers have raised the opium poppy as a legitimate cash crop and for its edible oil and seed. Moreover, Turkey has no heroin addiction problem itself, and Turkish farmers had little awareness of the magnitude of the problem in the United States.

So you can see that the diplomatic task was not easy, either for us or for the Turkish Government. We were gratified, therefore, when our vigorous efforts resulted in Turkey's decision last June to ban the production of opium following the harvesting of the 1971-72 crop. A strict licensing and control law has now been passed in Turkey to enforce the ban. Meanwhile, conscious of the effect on Turkey's economy, we assured the Turkish Government of financial assistance to offset foreign exchange losses from the export of legitimate opium products and to help establish alternative economic activities in the affected areas.

With the drying up of the Turkish opium supply, we expect illegal traffickers to turn increasingly to Southeast Asia, where there is substantial illegal or uncontrolled production of opium. We are therefore giving priority attention to engaging the cooperation of governments in this region.

Two Major Steps

Two major steps have already been taken to squeeze the producers in Southeast Asia. First, the United States and Thailand last September signed a memorandum of understanding by which the two countries pledged combined action against the supply and trafficking of illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs. Second, Laos has implemented a law prohibiting the growing, processing, trading and use of opium and the opiates.

In other parts of the world, the U.S. Government has been striving on a day-to-day basis to limit production and supply. Cooperation has been very close with the Governments of Canada and Mexico to control traffic across our common borders. We have signed an agreement with France providing for French narcotics agents to operate in the United States and for U.S. narcotics agents to operate in France. The recent sizable heroin seizures are evidence of the close cooperation that now exists between the French and U.S. police. We were, of course, heartened by the discovery last week of a heroin laboratory in the Marseille area, complete with all the equipment and supplies to manufacture pure heroin.

In the multilateral area, a U.S. initiative led to the creation last spring of a United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse

(Continued on Page 7)

DRUG CONTROL REPORT

(Continued From Page 6)

Control, to which we have made the major contribution of $2 million. We have also led the effort to strengthen the enforcement provisions of the 1961 international convention on narcotics, and we submitted to the Senate last June an international convention to control LSD and other manufactured substances.

This, I believe, is a very creditable record. During 1972 we want to go even further:

—We are seeking to increase regional cooperation in Southeast Asia to prevent that area from becoming a major source of heroin for the U.S. market.

—In cooperation with governments in this hemisphere, we are stepping up efforts to intercept illicit narcotics from Latin America, which in recent months has become a major transfer route to the United States.

—Through the United Nations and other international organizations, we are following through on the multilateral initiatives I have described.

Individual Action Plans

—Finally, and perhaps most important, the Cabinet Committee is developing individual action plans for cooperation with each of the more than 50 countries considered to have a current or potential involvement in the production, processing, or transiting of illicit hard drugs. When these plans are completed, we will use them as the basis for opening discussions with foreign governments on the negotiation of bilateral action programs.

These, then, are the steps we have taken and will be taking in the international area to curb the supply of illicit drugs to the United States. Of course, this supply depends ultimately on the domestic demand for narcotics, and this is a problem which must be solved at home. Efforts of the White House Council on Drug Abuse in educating Americans, particularly young Americans, to the dangers of drugs are making a major contribution toward solving it. Let me say in closing how much we appreciate those efforts. I hope you will continue and expand them, for the future welfare of our youth depends importantly on the steps we take today to eliminate the scourge of drug abuse.

DRUG ABUSE: Postal Smuggling

At Overseas Locations

X-Ray Machines Inspect Mail For Contraband, Drugs



BEFORE. This simulated attempt to "smuggle" drugs through the mails is easily identifiable by using the X-ray surveillance machines.

AFTER. Once the X-ray shows a potential shipment of contraband or drugs, the item is removed and opened by postal inspectors.
(Official U.S. Air Force Photos)

As part of a comprehensive program to prevent the shipment of contraband and drugs in the mails, the U.S. Air Force Postal and Courier Service recently put X-ray surveillance machines at locations overseas.

The machines are capable of revealing to postal inspectors the contents of a package or envelope without opening the seal.

The U.S. Air Force Postal and Courier Service is the mail manager for all Air Force mail and provides airmail services for all Department of Defense activities and in some cases for other Governmental Agencies overseas. All airmail going to or coming from servicemen overseas passes through aerial mail terminals.

The new machines operate on an X-ray fluorescence principle and produce an immediate image of a parcel's contents on the operator's screen. For example, the interior of a tape casette may be "seen" to be missing its usual spools of tape, metal clips, etc. If a would-be smuggler were to wrap an object in heavy lead foil, the presence of the very nearly opaque object would be sufficient cause to divert the package to a customs inspector.

The machines are designed to examine up to 4,800 units of mail a day. Hand controls permit the operator to position the package while it is in the X-ray compartment. While the X-ray image that the operator sees is one of great detail and complexity, it will not permit the operator to read writing on a page.

Job Information Fairs Held In Germany

A series of "Job Information Fairs," co-sponsored by the National Committee —Jobs for Veterans and the Department of Defense, are being conducted in Germany from March 27 through April 7 in support of President Richard Nixon's special programs to assist returning servicemen.

The main goals of the Information Fairs are to give attending servicemen advance job counseling, to acquaint servicemen with the employment situation in the United States, to emphasize career opportunities that are available in a variety of industries, and to alert them to the skills, education, and training they will need to find jobs.

Personnel representatives from 20 of America's major business firms and associations are participating in the counseling sessions, which will be attended by more than 10,000 soon-to-be-separated servicemen. James F. Oates Jr., National Chairman, Jobs for Veterans, was on hand for the opening sessions.

To assist in the counseling, representatives of the Departments of Defense and Labor, the Veterans Administration, the Office of Education, and the Military Services are attending.

Four Locations

Two-day meetings were scheduled at four locations: at Frankfurt, March 27-28; Kaiserslautern, March 30-31; Stuttgart, April 3-4; and at Fuerth/Nurnberg, April 6-7. Three sessions were planned for each day, each to accommodate about 500 servicemen.

Company Representatives

Each representative is acting as a spokesman for his company and the industry that company represents, outlining present and anticipated manpower demands. Associated with companies that hire in all parts of the country, the representatives are also able to brief servicemen on the employment situation in different States and metropolitan areas. Although company and association representatives are not signing up men for specific jobs, some referrals are expected to take place.

ARMED FORCES INITIATIVES

DOMESTIC ACTION. For some years the Federal Government, Navy and the Government of Guam have cooperated in providing opportunities for training to hundreds of local people, making it possible for them to become skilled workers. The training has included the Navy Apprentice Program and the Shop Trainee positions, both designed to turn out qualified journeymen in a vast variety of trades. It also included the Neighborhood Youth Corps Training Program, the Worker Trainees Program and others designed to train and qualify clerical and secretarial personnel. Recently another program has been added: the Manpower Development Training Act (MDTA) program, which began in Guam in July, 1971, and is geared toward teaching those people whose educational or economic background has not prepared them for other training programs. The U.S. Navy Public Works Center, Guam, has given support in many ways so that the newest program will succeed. Classes are being held in Navy classrooms and shops, utilizing the same facilities that the Navy uses for its apprentice program.

RESEARCH. Redstone Arsenal reports that Army researchers will soon start a series of experiments aimed at providing answers to one of the toughest problems in missilery—detecting and tracking high-speed aircraft at tree-top level, in darkness or bad weather. The U.S. Army Missile Command's (MICOM's) Research, Engineering, Development and Missile Systems Laboratories have a team from the Radar Branch of the Advanced Sensors Directorate readying a test bed radar system that will enable evaluation of a new radar technology. The equipment will allow MICOM researchers to conduct realistic exercises using simulated targets, or detect and track actual aircraft.

RACE RELATIONS. The Chicano Brothers Organization at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas, has been renamed Hermanos Latinos. People making up the new club include Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Panamanians and Hawaiians. It will serve as a social gathering to study ethnic history and culture and to foster better relations with other groups. Second Lieutenant Frank Mauro, base equal opportunity officer, recently briefed the group on the requirements that must be met under AFR 35-78 to establish such an organization.

INDIVIDUAL RECOGNITION. A Navy Seabee camp on the tiny island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean was dedicated Feb. 28 in memory of a young Seabee who lost his life while assisting in the construction of a U.S. Naval communications facility there. The Seabee camp is now known as "Camp Cummins" in honor of the late Navy Utilitiesman Third Class Charles Stuart Cummins, 23, who died on Dec. 30, 1971, two days after receiving body burns suffered when a boiler he was working on ruptured and exploded. Cummins, a three-year Navy veteran who had served in Vietnam, was from Clarendon Hills, Ill.

DRUG ABUSE. "The civilian and military segments of the population are just beginning to understand the problems peculiar to each in the area of alcohol and drug abuse." The remark, made by Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) Nicholas L. Rock, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program Coordinator at an Alcohol and Drug Abuse Symposium held recently at the Tripler Army Medical Center in Hawaii, reflects the changes that are coming about in the relationship between the civilian and military drug programs. On Jan. 24-25, six panels, consisting of 30 speakers in all, met before an audience of over 200 persons to air the problems of, and possible solutions to, drug abuse. Among the conclusions was the obvious fact that alcoholism, rather than illicit drug abuse, is the primary problem of both the civilian and military communities.

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